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Vegetarian eating
Josh Milburn
Abstract: The philosophical literature may seem to be replete with arguments
for vegetarianism based on harm to animals. However, these arguments turn
out to be arguments for veganism, not vegetarianism. This chapter explores
whether  anything  can  be  said  for  vegetarianism.  Some  reasons  motivating
vegetarianism seem to be very personal, and so not the sorts of things that
could be the foundation of a moral argument. Meanwhile, though they may
hold some weight, arguments about vegetarianism as a “middle way” between
veganism and omnivorism are highly contingent. Both of these routes, then,
may seem unsatisfying to the vegetarian. Could there be a principled case for
vegetarianism? Tzachi Zamir is the one philosopher who has argued at length
for vegetarianism over veganism, but a close examination of his arguments
show that they are not as compelling as they first seem. A final option remains
open: there may be potential for arguments critiquing the eating of animals’
flesh  and/or  their  bodies  that  are  independent  of  concerns  about  harms to
animals in food production.  Such arguments,  which have been hinted at in
animal ethics, offer a critique of meat consumption, but not, necessarily, of
egg and dairy  consumption.  Perhaps,  then,  they  could  form the  basis  of  a
principled case for vegetarianism that does not immediately become a case for
veganism. The consequences of such an argument, if one can be made, are not
simple.
1: Thinking about vegetarianism
It is difficult to find, or come up with, arguments for vegetarianism. To anyone familiar with
the academic literature on the ethics of eating meat, or anyone who has ever offered sincere
thought to the issue, this might sound like a silly claim. Is the philosophical literature not
replete with arguments for vegetarianism? Are there not arguments for vegetarianism in the
work of some of the most prominent ethicists of the 20 th and 21st century? Are the reasons in
favour of vegetarianism not obvious to anyone who has read about the suffering of animals in
agriculture and the environmental impact of the meat industry?
In order to answer this question, vegetarianism needs to be distinguished from a range
of other diets. Vegetarians are people who do not eat meat. For our purposes, “meat” includes
the flesh or body of any animal, including fish and invertebrates. Less restrictive diets include
what is often called omnivorism, which is a diet including a more or less “normal” amount of
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meat.  Using  omnivorism  in  this  sense  is  problematic:  Strictly  speaking,  all  humans  are
omnivores.  Omnivory  is  a  matter  of  biology,  not  of  practice,  culture,  attitude,  or  ethics.
Nonetheless,  this  common  convention  will  be  followed.  Precisely  how  much  meat  an
omnivorous  diet  contains  will  depend  on  the  social,  economic,  and  cultural  context.
Vegetarianism  must  also  be  distinguished  from  various  kinds  of  demi-vegetarian  diets,
including  pescetarianism  (like  vegetarianism,  but  including  the  meat  of  fish)  and
reducetarianism (which involves a conscious attempt to reduce, but not necessarily eliminate,
meat – and perhaps other animal products – in one’s diet). Crucially, however, it must also be
distinguished  from  more restrictive  diets,  including  veganism.  Vegans  avoid  all animal
products in their diets (and likely more broadly) – not just meat. And what we find when we
consider  prominent  and  mainstream  arguments  for  vegetarianism  is  that  they  are  really
arguments for veganism.
Can anything be said for vegetarianism, rather than veganism? Specifically, are there
any arguments that should convince individuals to be vegetarian, but not vegan? Exploring
that question is the purpose of the present chapter. Thus, the chapter will not review standard
arguments  for  and against  the  consumption  of  animal  products.  For  recent  and  in-depth
reviews of  these  questions,  readers  are  invited  to  consult  Abbate  [forthcoming],  Doggett
2018,  Fischer  2018,  Katz  and McPherson  2019  [present  volume],  and  McPherson 2018.
Instead,  the  present  chapter  will  explore  arguments  for  vegetarianism  in  contrast  to
omnivorous diets, but also – perhaps more importantly – in contrast to vegan diets.
In section 2, the chapter will indicate how classic cases for vegetarianism are actually
cases  for  veganism.  It  will  then  move  on  to  explore,  in  section  3,  some  relatively
straightforward  reasons that  people  may favour vegetarianism over  veganism that  do not
really draw upon moral reasons at all.  In section 4, it will ask whether one could defend
vegetarianism as being enough for one to do one’s duty, and critique veganism as being over-
demanding. We will see, though, that any argument for vegetarianism on these grounds faces
some tricky problems. While these problems may not be insurmountable, they do mean that
the  argument  holds  only  very  contingently.  In  section  5,  the  chapter  will  turn  to  the
arguments of Tzachi Zamir, the only writer in the philosophical literature to argue at length
for vegetarianism over veganism. His case relies on a vision of a vegetarian utopia contrasted
with  a  vision  of  a  vegan  utopia,  and  a  claim  about  effective  campaigning  on behalf  of
animals.  Nonetheless,  we will  see that  there are serious problems with his  arguments.  In
section 6, the chapter will explore whether there is something about the eating of animals’
bodies or their flesh that makes meat-eating, in contrast to eating eggs and dairy products, a
particular  wrong.  If  there  is,  that  could  ground  a  case  for  vegetarianism  without  also
grounding a case for veganism in principle, and perhaps – crucially – in practice. Section 7
concludes.
2: Arguing for veg(etari)anism
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There  are  plenty  of  cases  for  vegetarianism  in  the  academic  literature,  but,  on  closer
inspection, they turn out to be cases for veganism. By way of example, let us look to the
arguments for vegetarianism that revolve around harm to animals. Other kinds of arguments –
including environmental arguments – will be explored later.
Let us take Robert Nozick’s case for vegetarianism. This appears in Anarchy, State,
and Utopia, which is one of the most-read works of 20th century political philosophy. He
begins by asserting – reasonably,  we might  think – that  “[a]nimals  count for something”
(1974, 35). “Suppose”, he says, “that eating animals is not necessary for health and is not less
expensive than alternative equally healthy diets”. Thus, the advantage of “eating animals is
the pleasures of the palate, gustatory delights, varied tastes” (1974, 35-6, emphasis Nozick’s).
The question is whether “they [that is, the pleasures], or rather … the marginal addition in
them gained by eating animals rather than only nonanimals, outweigh the moral weight to be
given  to  animals’  lives  and  pain”  (1974,  36-7,  emphasis  Nozick’s).  The  death  of  these
animals, Nozick says, is surely  incidental to the pleasure gained by eating them – but that
does not prove that the eating is permissible:
Suppose then that I enjoy swinging a baseball bat. It happens that in front of the only
place  to  swing  it  stands  a  cow.  Swinging  the  bat  unfortunately  would  involve
smashing the cow’s head. But I wouldn’t get fun from doing that; the pleasure comes
from exercising my muscles, swinging well, and so on. It’s unfortunate that as a side
effect (not a means) of my doing this, the animal’s skull gets smashed. To be sure, I
could forego swinging the bat, and instead bend down and touch my toes or do some
other exercise. But this wouldn’t be as enjoyable as swinging the bat; I won’t get as
much fun, pleasure, or delight out of it. So the question is: would it be all right for me
to swing the bat in order for me to get the extra pleasure of swinging it as compared to
the best available alternative activity that does not involve harming the animal? (1974,
37, emphasis Nozick’s)
Nozick can see no way to justify the eating of meat that does not also justify the swinging of
bats in the above case. It could be that an omnivore could accept this – eating meat  and
swinging bats are acceptable. Nozick doesn’t say this explicitly, but he presumably holds that
such a judgement flies in the face of the intuitive notion that animals count for something, or
at  least  the  unstated  additional  assumption  that  this  “something”  is  non-negligible  (cf.
Milburn 2017; Milburn 2018b).  Instead,  in Nozick’s  view,  “the extra  benefits  Americans
today can gain from eating animals  do  not justify doing it.  So we shouldn’t”  (1974, 38,
emphasis Nozick’s).
In  this  argument,  Nozick  talks  about  meat,  and,  in  other  places,  speaks  of  his
vegetarianism. But it should be clear that the argument actually works far better as a case for
veganism than as a case for vegetarianism (Milburn 2017, fn. 2).  Eggs and milk are not
necessary for human health, and alternatives are accessible to many in the West. The farming
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of eggs and milk involves the infliction of a great deal of death: male chicks are killed shortly
after  birth,  while  male  calves  are killed  as  unnecessary  or  are raised  for  meat  (and thus
killed).  Meanwhile,  both hens  and cows are killed  at  a  fraction  of their  lifespan as  their
productivity drops. These practices – and many others common in the industries – lead to a
great deal of suffering. Such practices are required if we want to have access to eggs and milk
at  prices  anywhere near  as  cheap as  those  currently  commonplace.  So,  exactly  the  same
argument that Nozick offers for vegetarianism can be run for veganism. Indeed, Nozick’s
arguments resemble those of Anna Charlton and Gary Francione (2016), though the latter
explicitly  focus  on  veganism,  rather  than  vegetarianism.  Charlton  and  Francione  paint  a
picture of a man named Fred, who keeps animals in his home in pain and then kills them,
simply because doing so offers him pleasure. But we recognise that this is not a good reason
for him to torture and kill these animals. When it comes to eating animals, “we are all Fred”
(2016, 296). As such, unless we wish to jettison our view that animals – to parrot Nozick –
count for something, we should be vegans. (Here, Charlton and Francione are offering their
“common-sense” case for veganism, and not defending their “abolitionist” position.)
Nozick’s case for vegetarianism thus sounds more like a case for veganism. The same
sort of observation can be made about the respective cases for vegetarianism of Peter Singer
(1980) and Tom Regan (1975),  the  20th century’s  foremost  animal  ethicists.  The precise
details of these arguments need not concern us, in part because they are not dissimilar to
Nozick’s, but especially as – perhaps with a few caveats – neither Regan nor Singer would
have too much trouble admitting that they were ultimately talking about veganism. The word
veganism, it is perhaps worth noting, was little-used in the US in the 1970s.
A final  example  is  offered by the arguments  of Carol  Adams (1990),  whose  The
Sexual  Politics  of  Meat offers,  according  to  its  subtitle,  “a  feminist-vegetarian  critical
theory”. In the book, Adams links the eating of meat to sexism, tying together the treatment
of animals  in  a  meat-eating culture  and the treatment  of women in a patriarchal  culture.
However, this link holds no less with milk and eggs than it does with meat. Indeed, eggs and
milk are the key examples of “feminized protein” – the production of protein from plants via
the female reproductive system. Thus, Adams’s critique of patriarchal eating practices is far
from complete when addressing only meat-eating;  there is  room for feminist  critiques  of
dairy and eggs to be at least as fervent as feminist critiques of meat. Adams now describes
her position as “feminist-vegan” (2010), and has written that though The Sexual Politics of
Meat “was subtitled A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory, in terms of [her] understanding
of feminized protein, and its use and abuse of female bodies, it could have A Feminist-Vegan
Critical Theory” (2017, 23).
Let us take this as indicative: Though the philosophical literature is ostensibly replete
with arguments for vegetarianism, these are actually arguments for veganism. This is due to
the very real existence of death, suffering, and exploitation in the egg and dairy industry.
3: Personal motivations for vegetarianism
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We  may  think  that  all  of  this  is  by-the-by,  and  that  –  philosophers’  arguments  for
vegetarianism aside – we can easily  come up with reasons to be vegetarian  that  are not
reasons to be vegan. One set of arguments will drop the focus on the death and suffering of
animals as the motivating concern for vegetarians, and look to other factors. Many of these
reasons – however important they are for individual vegetarians – should not be taken to be
particular good reasons for other people. They are thus not, no matter how good or bad, the
right kind of “reasons” for vegetarianism. Ethicists are concerned with all reasons for action,
but they are most interested in reasons for action that do not depend on idiosyncratic beliefs.
The “ethical” perspective taken by this chapter seeks reasons for vegetarianism that are not
unique to a particular  person, culture,  or people.  Instead,  it  seeks reasons that  should be
applicable generally. This does not mean that they will not rest upon potentially controversial
claims  about  science  or  ethics  –  but  these  claims  may be  ones  that  should be  generally
accepted, whether or not they are generally accepted. The reasons explored in this section are
not like this. They are personal, or rest upon beliefs that are not the  kind of beliefs that an
ethicist would typically call on all people to hold.
One  reason  for  vegetarianism  could  be  health.  Some  vegetarians  may  hold  that
vegetarianism has  health  advantages  over  omnivorism  and  veganism.  Equally,  of  course,
many vegans hold that their diet has advantages over vegetarianism and omnivorism, and
plenty of omnivores hold that their diet has advantages over veganism and vegetarianism.
Were it the case that these vegetarians were unambiguously correct, this might – along with
some claims about the ethics of healthy eating – form the basis of a moral argument for
vegetarianism.  There  is,  however,  likely  some truth to  the claims  of  the vegetarians,  the
vegans,  and  the  omnivores  (especially  when  atypical  dietary  needs  are  considered).  The
healthfulness of a diet is not a simple matter. Well-planned, balanced vegan, vegetarian, and
omnivorous diets can all be healthful, though – crucially – all can carry risks that are not
associated with the others. For example, while iron deficiencies can be associated with both
vegetarian and vegan diets, these diets are also associated with lower risks of heart disease
(Melina, Craig, and Levin 2016). So, while some vegetarians may be motivated by health, it
remains to be seen that this argument should convince others – there is no evidence of a
consensus  among  dietitians  about  the  all-things-considered  “best”  diet  for  health,  and
different kinds of health concerns are going to pull particular people in different directions.
Some vegetarians might be motivated by religious concerns. So, for example, many
Jains, Buddhists, Rastafari,  Sikhs, Seventh Day Adventists,  and Hindus follow vegetarian
diets. There are also minority vegetarian traditions in other faiths, including Christianity and
Judaism, as well as individual believers of a range of faiths (and none) who see religious or
spiritual  significance  to  their  vegetarianism.  Other  religious  practices  may  blur  the  lines
between veganism,  vegetarianism,  and omnivorism.  For  example,  Hindu vegetarians  will
frequently abstain from eggs as well as meat, while restrictions on particular meats are typical
among even omnivorous Jews and Muslims. Naturally, if someone holds that their religious
doctrine (or personal spiritual development) demands, encourages, or endorses vegetarianism
but does not demand, encourage, or endorse veganism, that will be a very good reason for
them to be vegetarian, but not vegan. It is true that veganism is less typical as a religious
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practice – though certainly not uncommon of among many of the broadly vegetarian groups,
including Jains, Rastafari, and Seventh Day Adventists. Meanwhile, members of some New
Religious  Movements  –  such  as  the  followers  of  “Supreme  Master”  Ching  Hai  –  are
overwhelmingly vegan. Reasons for being vegetarian that are grounded in religious beliefs
are not transferable to people who do not share these religious beliefs. Nonetheless, healthy
internal debates  in particular  religions’ ethical  discourses on veganism and vegetarianism
should not be overlooked by scholars interested in the ethics of eating meat (see, e.g., Linzey
and Linzey 2018) – they should not, however, be taken to be universalisable in the way that
arguments from philosophical ethics can be.
Similarly, some vegetarians might stick to their vegetarianism, even in the face of a
vegan alternative,  because vegetarianism is part of their cultural inheritance in a way that
veganism is not. So, for example, someone who was raised as a vegetarian may not have any
attachment  to  the  goals  of  reducing  harm  to  animals.  Vegetarianism  need  not  even  be
something  that  they  have  particularly  thought  about.  There  is  nothing  fundamentally
irrational about this. Again, though, we should not take a given person’s cultural practices to
be  normatively  significant  for  the  rest  of  us  –  beyond,  potentially,  as  something  to  be
respected, within reason.
We can note a final reason for being vegetarian that can be quickly dispensed with as
entirely personal: some vegetarians may have an aesthetic objection to meat, but not to eggs
and dairy – they do not  like meat’s  taste,  texture,  or  similar.  Thus,  these people have a
perfectly good reason to be vegetarian but not vegan. However, unless this aesthetic reason is
tied to something deeper, there is no reason to think that their vegetarianism is something that
anyone else should take up.
These, to repeat, are not the kinds of reasons that should serve to convince others.
Perhaps they could become the right kind of reason. For example, if there really was a God
commanding us to be vegetarian rather than vegan, that could be normatively significant. But,
short  of  proving that  there  is  such a  God,  the  religious  vegetarian  should  not  expect  to
convince skeptics. What is more, the person who is vegetarian for one of these reasons should
be ready to acknowledge that there may be ethical reasons that override their more personal
reasons. For example, while someone belonging to a culture that has a given practice has a
good reason to engage in that practice, they should be ready to admit that, if the practice is
unethical or unjust, their cultural practice should give way to good moral sense. 
4: Vegetarianism as a middle way
Are there any arguments for vegetarianism (and not veganism) that are not deeply personal?
Surely some arguments – in everyday dialogue, if not the philosophical literature – will point
towards vegetarianism’s status as a “middle ground” between veganism and omnivorism. So,
we could  acknowledge the positive arguments for veganism related to the moral status of
animals,  or the environmental  damage associated with animal agriculture,  but nonetheless
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hold that we are doing “enough” if we switch from omnivorism to vegetarianism, and argue
that an imperative to switch to veganism is too demanding.
This  kind  of  argument  is  vulnerable  to  at  least  two  kinds  of  counters.  The  first
observes  that  vegetarianism  need  not  be  thought  of  as  a  suitable  compromise  position
between  omnivorism  and  veganism,  insofar  as  meat  need  not  be  more  harmful  (in
environmental,  animal-welfare,  or  all-things-considered  terms)  than  eggs  and milk.  Mark
Budolfson (2015; 2018) is one philosopher who has collated empirical evidence to support
this  claim by calculating  “harm footprints” of different  foods.  Much of  this  supports  the
claims  of  the  vegetarian  motivated  by environmental  concerns.  Take Budolfson’s  figures
related to beef production. He suggests greenhouse gas emissions of 102kg CO2eq (i.e., the
release of greenhouse gases doing the equivalent damage of 102kg of carbon dioxide) per kg
of protein produced, and 93kg CO2eq per 10,000kcal produced. Cabbage, on the other hand,
sees 25kg CO2eq per kg of protein, and 13kg CO2eq per 10,000kcal. When it comes to water
usage,  beef requires 75,969 litres to produce 1kg of protein and 60,645 litres to produce
10,000kcal of energy. Cabbage requires 21,875 litres and 11,200 litres respectively. Cabbage
significantly wins out. As the vegetarian might expect, milk ranks somewhere in the middle,
producing 60kg CO2eq per kg of protein (which needs 25,270 litres of water), and 31kg
CO2eq per 10,000kcal (needing 13,049 litres of water).
The trouble is that once we start adding in  other possible products, the omnivore <
vegetarian < vegan picture starts to fall apart. One particularly disruptive example is mussels,
which  produce  a  mere  6kg  CO2eq  per  kg  of  protein  and  8kg  CO2eq  per  10,000kcal.
(Budolfson provides no data on how much fresh water they require, but, given that they are
farmed hanging in the sea, one imagines very little.) If the vegetarian is motivated by finding
a “middle ground” between omnivorism and veganism, it is not obvious that they should be
dropping mussels rather than milk. (It is worth acknowledging, incidentally, that Budolfson’s
picture also troubles the vegan argument.)
What if the motivation for vegetarians is not environmental but animal-focussed? The
simple fact is that – counter-intuitively or not – it is not clear that there is less harm in the
farming of eggs and milk than there is in the farming of meat. 
Consider, by way of example, milk farming. Karin Kolbe (2018, 472-4) identifies four
key areas of suffering resulting from just one practice in the dairy industry: the separation of
cow and calf.  This  is  something practiced  even on organic,  high-welfare  farms.  It  leads,
Kolbe argues, to deprivation to the mother, who would prefer to be with the calf; deprivation
to the calf, leading to health problems; welfare problems associated with the other farms to
which the calves are sent; and the slaughter of calves at a very young age. Kolbe also offers
detailed statistics for the number of calories of milk produced per death of a male calf –
neither deaths of female calves nor the cows themselves are included in this.  Within the
European Union, this varies from 473,668 per male calf in Slovenia to 1,175,992 per male
calf in Denmark, but the average is 804,712 per male calf.  While this is greater than the
calories produced by killing smaller cattle bred for beef – a female highland cow (the smaller
sex  of  a  small  breed)  provides  some  500,000  calories  –  even  the  highly  efficient  milk
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production in Denmark cannot compare to meat production in terms of calories per death
when it comes to larger breeds of cattle raised for beef. A male Charolais produces some
1,750,000 calories  of  meat,  while  a  Blonde d’Aquitaine  bull  produces  1,625,000 (Kolbe
2018, 474-6). Kolbe thus concludes that the production of dairy is a greater ethical problem
than the production of beef: “suffering of animals and death per calories created are higher in
dairy farming than in meat production” (2018, 469).
Perhaps something similar is true of eggs. Chickens are very small, and though they
lay lots of eggs in their lifetimes, they are unable to produce anywhere near the amount of
food through laying eggs as a cow can through being slaughtered. Thus, a lot of chickens
living short lives full of suffering and then being killed when their productivity drops might
seem to be a greater ethical problem than a single cow being killed – even if she, too, has led
a life of suffering followed by an early death. More animals means more suffering and more
death. This leads Nick Cooney (2014, 3-9) to argue that it is much more important for those
concerned with reducing animal death and suffering to eliminate eggs than eliminate beef.
Consuming eggs leads to more animal deaths a year (2 chickens per omnivorous American
versus 1/8 a beef cow per omnivorous American), more days of animal suffering a year (a
year per omnivorous American for egg-laying hens, 23 days per omnivorous American for
beef cows), and, indeed – Cooney argues – more intense suffering.
Finally, we can add that mussels once again create a puzzle – at least if Budolfson’s
assessment of them is right:
…mussels have essentially no animal harm footprint at all – partly because mussels
are not conscious and so harvesting them does not involve animal harm that has any
important weight, and partly because the land and water footprint of mussels is very
small[.] (2018, 91)
The point  of  these  quantitative  explorations  of  harm is  the  following:  if  vegetarians  are
genuinely interested in identifying a “middle ground” between veganism and omnivorism, it
is not clear that vegetarianism (as we understand the term) is it. Now, perhaps we can quibble
with the numbers or assumptions of Kolbe, Cooney, or Budolfson. Regardless, vegetarians
must do some careful arguing to show that their position  is a suitable middle-ground. We
should not jump to any conclusions about (particular) meats being so much worse than milk
and/or eggs.
But this leads us to the second worry. Even if vegetarians can justify vegetarianism as
a suitable “middle-ground” approach between veganism and omnivorism, they will need to
justify favouring the “middle-ground” rather than the “extreme” – i.e., if these vegetarians
acknowledge worries about harms to animals or the environment, why be vegetarian rather
than vegan? Two possibilities present themselves. One will be that adopting the vegetarian
position is more likely to be effective as a political matter. This is something that will be
touched upon in the next section. The second is that veganism is too demanding – i.e., that it
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calls for a high level of change in our lives, one that is disproportionate to the harm it aims to
prevent (or speak against).
No doubt it  is  sometimes  true that  switching to a vegan diet  is  difficult,  and,  for
individual vegetarians, that will explain their decision not to go “all the way”. The (putative)
relative difficulty of following a vegan diet, of course, is highly contingent (and the same is
true when it comes to political expediency). It is going to be far easier to follow a vegan diet
in some places than in others, and – in much of the Western world, at least – it is quickly
becoming far easier to follow a vegan diet than it was. And, of course, vegans may challenge
the moral relevance of this difficulty. Even relatively difficult changes – they might say – are
required to combat the horrors of animal agriculture and/or climate change.
There is, however, an important contextual argument that is open to the vegetarian in
response to these vegan challenges. This is that vegetarianism is an established, recognised
dietary identity in a way that other “demi-vegan” diets simply are not. Thus, the vegetarian
could say, given that (in a given context) veganism is difficult for them and given that (in the
context in question) vegetarianism is a recognised identity in a way that other possible dietary
identities  are  not,  vegetarianism  is  the  appropriate  diet  for  them.  This  recognition  of
vegetarianism – where it exists – is significant for three interrelated reasons.
First, it simply makes things practically easy for the individual in question: to put it in
blunt terms, they can ask for the vegetarian menu in restaurants, and look out for “suitable for
vegetarians” messages on food packaging. But there is another side to this: there is a clear,
bright line for the individuals to follow. They can tell relatively easily whether something is
“suitable” for them – if it contains dead animals, it is not. If it does not contain dead animals,
it is fine. This can help deal with the kinds of biases that, as individuals, we face. Clear and
precise rules are easy to follow; vegetarians are less likely to waver in their commitments
than people following more complicated diets for ethical reasons (see Rothgerber 2015).
Second,  in  belonging to  a movement  – the vegetarian  movement  – the individual
vegetarian is more likely to be practically (including politically) efficacious than if they chose
to follow their own idiosyncratic diet. This is true even if their own idiosyncratic diet would
be, were it adopted by all vegetarians, more efficacious than vegetarianism. This efficacy is
not limited to the point about the numbers involved. It relates to its communicability: The
vegetarian cares about animals, so she does not eat them. On the other hand, the adherent of
an unnamed demi-vegan diet cares about animals, so she does not eat some animal products
and some plant products (or perhaps does not eat some products produced in certain specified
ways). It is not hard to see whose message is easier to transmit – not only is the vegetarian’s
message simpler, but it can be transmitted in a single, familiar word. 
Third, vegetarianism is already recognised as a less extreme form of veganism – what
is more, vegetarianism is likely far more recognisable than is veganism. Thus, whether or not
the vegetarian is right to think that vegetarianism is  really a good middle ground between
veganism and omnivorism, they will be  perceived as treading that middle ground, and that
may be what matters, if their vegetarianism is intended – in part or in whole – as a symbolic
socio-political statement.
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We seem to have reached a good argument for vegetarianism – and not veganism –
but this depends on contingent, wholly changeable (putative) facts – facts, indeed, that will
vary  geographically  and  historically.  These  concern  veganism’s  relative  inaccessibility,
vegetarianism’s  relative  accessibility,  the  relative  familiarity  of  vegetarianism,  and  the
relative  unfamiliarity  of  other  possible  “part-way  to  vegan”  diets.  Though  this  kind  of
argument has some potential, the vegetarian may want a less contingent argument for their
position. For that, we will have to look elsewhere.
5: Zamir’s case for vegetarianism
The only philosopher to argue at length for vegetarianism in contrast to both omnivorism and
veganism is Tzachi Zamir (2004; 2007). Zamir argues that a vegetarian utopia is a more
compelling vision – for both humans and animals – than a vegan utopia.  The benefits  to
humans include, primarily, access to eggs and milk. The benefits to animals are assessed on
three grounds:
1) Quantitative. More animals will exist in a vegetarian world than a vegan world. Now,
this speaks in favour of a meat-eating world over a vegetarian world. This leads to…
2) Qualitative. Many animals in the contemporary meat industry do not have lives worth
living. This, however, is a contingent point. Why could we not have a meat-eating
world in which animals lived happy lives? After all, Zamir’s vegetarian world would
be one much kinder to animals kept for eggs and milk – as he accepts, their lives are
often very bad on contemporary farms – so why could he not propose a world much
kinder to animals kept for meat? This leads to…
3) Teleological. “[I]t may be the case”, Zamir writes, “that a pleasant life should not be
lived if it ends in a way that is immoral” (2004, 372). When we bring a being into the
world with a plan – such as killing and eating them – we must ask whether such a plan
“constitute[s] a misrecognition of what having a life means” (2004, 372). In what we
might call a humane-farming utopia, where animals are bred for meat but are raised in
humane ways, animals may live in a way that “is better than not living: but it is not
hard to imagine someone saying that such a life should not be lived” (2004, 373).
Zamir’s conclusion is that a vegetarian utopia is able to benefit both animals (in quantitative
terms) and humans relative to a vegan utopia, is able to avoid the qualitative harms replete in
contemporary forms of industrial  agriculture,  and is able to avoid the teleological wrongs
involved in farming for meat (“humanely” or otherwise). Thus, the vegetarian utopia to be
preferred both to the vegan utopia and the humane-farming utopia.
If  Zamir’s  conclusion  was  simply  one  about  how  ethical  and  political  systems
fostering high levels of respect for animals could, in principle, support the consumption of
ultra-humane  forms  of  egg  and  milk  production,  then  he  would  find  himself  in  good
company.  For  example,  many  recent  approaches  in  political  philosophy  theorising  ideal
forms  of  human-animal  relationships  –  despite  being  written  by  vegan  animal-rights
advocates – have left room for the consumption of eggs and dairy (see, e.g., Cochrane 2012,
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86-9; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 134-2; Wayne 2013). Admittedly, these philosophers
and political theorists likely see much less room for the consumption of eggs and milk in an
ideal state than does Zamir. But they seem to be clear examples of what he calls “tentative
vegans” (2004, 367) – people who accept that, in principle, the consumption of eggs and milk
is permissible, but who argue that, currently, given the harms perpetuated against animals in
the milk and egg industries, we should be vegan. But Zamir wants to go a step further than
these  theorists,  and advocates  for  vegetarianism (and  not veganism)  in  practice,  and  not
merely in theory.
His argument for this is thoroughly pragmatic: “selective consumption, rather than a
total ban, allows pro-animal people to financially support institutions that take steps in the
right  direction”  (2004,  374).  He  proposes  three  criteria  to  judge  whether  supporting  an
institution (e.g., eating eggs from this farm) is commendable.
First, the step forward must be substantial; not just any improvement justifies support
for a flawed institution. For example, though Zamir holds that the institution of child labour
(like the institution of egg production) is  not  inherently  unjust,  one should not buy from
factories using child labour just because they, unlike their competitors, offer the children a
break and a cup of tea (2004, 375). If Zamir is right, though, there is presumably some level
of improvement that would justify supporting them. Zamir holds that, despite the continued
killing of unproductive females and practically all males, egg and milk farms that allow their
animals to roam freely are making a large step forward, and so should be supported (2004,
375).
Tentative vegans may well want to dispute this. Francione and Charlton – who, it
should be noted, would be  principled, rather than  tentative, vegans – say that “free-range”
policies “are to animal ethics what padded water boards for use at Guantanamo Bay” would
be to prison reform (2017, 300). There are two sides to this critique. One is that the steps
taken by these institutions are not large. The other is that, even if they were, supporting steps
“forward” might miss the point, insofar as the institutions remain fundamentally unjust. (To
be clear,  on Zamir’s  own framework,  the killing  of  these unproductive animals  is  still  a
serious problem – he does not hold that the lack of freedom enjoyed by cows and chickens is
the only, or even largest, injustice in the contemporary egg and milk industries.) To adapt
Charlton and Francione’s example, it would surely be a large step forward for an institution
which tortured innocent prisoners to stop torturing them, but we might think that we should
never be supporting institutions that imprison the innocent – whether or not they torture them.
(Zamir could respond that imprisoning the innocent is always wrong, while egg farming is
not always wrong. We will get to this shortly.)
Second, Zamir holds that a choice to support egg and milk producers should consider
the effectiveness of the action. Veganism is typically harder than vegetarianism, meaning that
many potential converts could be lost. Zamir holds that this means that veganism is counter-
productive, but this is actually far from clear. To justify that claim, one would have to weigh
the impact of a smaller number of vegans against a larger number of vegetarians, and, in any
case, one would need to clearly tie the impact of these groups to a particular goal; not just
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short-term reform, but – Zamir’s own words – “the overall political goal” (2004, 377). It is
not simply a matter of judging how much impact one has over the next week, but a case of
judging the extent to which the collective actions bring us closer to the ideal. Even if Zamir is
right that veganism is counter-productive by (say) leading to greater harm to animals at the
present time – and that is far from clear, as it is ultimately an empirical issue – it may be that
it  is more productive in the long run. The most effective route to the top of a mountain
sometimes takes one downhill.
There  are,  Zamir  thinks,  limits  to  this  strategic  prudence.  Zamir  rejects  demi-
vegetarianism. Though prudential (i.e., though he takes it that demi-vegetarianism will attract
more  converts  than  vegetarianism  or  veganism),  demi-vegetarianism,  “like  occasional
molesting”,  involves  “occasional  participation  in  a  morally  wrong  act  and  is  hence
unjustified” (2004, 376). He rejects the obvious vegan response that support for the egg and
milk industry is wrong. He is uninterested in assessing the merit of competing descriptions of
vegetarian  consumption  – e.g.,  of  the merits  of  describing  actions  “as  supporting reform
[versus] as supporting fig-leaf exploitation” (2004, 376). He justifies this by again referring
back to the value of co-operating with reforming (but imperfect)  institutions (2004, 376).
This is insufficient. This point does not differentiate co-operation with a reforming egg or
milk industry and co-operating with a reforming meat industry, which is what he needs for
his argument to hold. All three industries involve, by his own admission, great wrongs – so
why is he committed to supporting two of the industries, but not the third? (And, in any case,
differentiating between these industries may not be as easy as Zamir seems to assume.)
Zamir seems to differentiate between the meat industry (on one hand) the egg and
milk industries (on the other) by arguing that the meat industry is  inherently unjust, while
institutions of milk and egg farming are not. He opposes the consumption of meat on the
grounds that it “complet[es] a temporally extended wrong” – that is, it completes the wrong
started by the farmer,  thus bringing together  the ethics  of consumption and the ethics  of
production – and that  there is  a “conceptually  distinct  wrong of participating in a wrong
practice,  even  when  one’s  consumption  does  not  increase  suffering”  (2007,  48).  (The
importance of tying together consumption and production is that causal-impotence objections
to ethical eating will contend that this act of eating has no impact on that act of production,
and thus that refusing to eat meat on a given occasion will have no impact on the animals
harmed by the meat industry. This is discussed at length in the reviews of arguments about
meat-eating cited in section 1, so will receive no further examination here. See also Nefsky
2018.) In an unpleasantly evocative passage, Zamir compares the eating of meat, even when
the act of consumption does not contribute to harm, to the use of a child prostitutes when “the
pain or harm done to the children involved” will not be increased by the abuse, either because
the  prostituted  child  will  not  notice  “one  more  indistinguishable  client”,  or  because  the
“client” can make the situation better for the victim – for example, by “tipping generously or
behaving nicer than other clients would” (2007, 48). Zamir, however, refuses to extend the
same analysis to the consumption of eggs and milk:
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…avoiding eggs and dairy because of the immoral production practices these rely on
cannot be conceptualised in terms of avoiding the completion of or participation of a
wrong in the same sense of the prostituted child or the killed animals example. Unlike
eggs or milk, no reform to a child-prostitution establishment will justify participation.
(2007, 49-50)
The problem here is that child prostitution and meat-eating are not analogous in in the way
Zamir  makes  them  out  to  be,  even  within  his  own  framework.  Thus,  while  Zamir  has
adequately distinguished child prostitution from eating eggs and milk, he – once again – has
not adequately distinguished eating eggs and milk from eating meat.
Why are child prostitution and meat-eating not analogous in the relevant sense? Zamir
actually repeatedly accepts that meat farming  could be reformed to be consistent with his
position: His “formulation of vegetarianism allows for eating and using animals that have not
died from planned killing for the purpose of eating them” (2007, 49). Thus, crucially, his
“position does not prescribe a ban on raising animals for the purpose of eating them after they
die on their own” (2007, 49). Thus, while “no reform to a child-prostitution establishment
will justify participation” (2007, 50), there is reform to a meat-producing institution that will
justify participation. Consequently, the in-principle distinction between farming meat (on the
one hand) and farming eggs and milk (on the other) dissolves. In both cases – according to
Zamir’s own position – the practices are real-world problematic while ideal-world plausible.
He thus cannot appeal to ideal-world possibilities to permit the consumption of eggs and milk
in the real world unless he is also willing to appeal to ideal-world possibilities to permit the
consumption of meat in the real world.
Perhaps  the  distinction  is  found in  the  third  of  Zamir’s  criteria  to  identify  farms
worthy of support. He asks animal advocates to judge “the magnitude of the loss experienced
by the exploited entity as part of obtaining a particular product” (2004, 377). Crucial here is
the claim that chickens do mind having their eggs taken and cows do not mind having their
milk taken. We can grant this (contentious) claim for the sake of argument, but its relevance
for our actions here and now is questionable. The loss to the unproductive chickens and cows,
and to male calves and chicks, is absolute. They are killed. “[T]aking eggs and milk does not
create suffering and loss”, Zamir writes, and “[b]oycotting products, the taking of which does
not create suffering, seems extreme” (2004, 378). If Zamir is arguing that contemporary egg
and milk farming are free of suffering and loss, his claim is false. Calves as separated from
their mothers, udders are afflicted with mastitis,  and cows undergo the terror, injury, and
deprivation  associated  with  transport  and  slaughter  whether  they  are  given  a  degree  of
freedom or not. And the male calves and spent cows who are killed lose everything. (Similar
could be said about egg farming.) And, what is more, Zamir holds that it is “excusable” to
purchase eggs and milk from less humane farms if products from more humane farms “are
implausibly difficult to obtain” (2004, 378). So even if more humane forms of farming were
free  from  suffering  and  loss,  Zamir  would  still  excuse  vegetarians  who  support  those
institutions that do cause suffering and loss. So it cannot be that the moral distinction between
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eggs and milk on the one hand and meat on the other is that the former’s acquisition does not
in fact result in a “high magnitude of … loss” (2004, 377).
The distinction instead seems to be that their acquisition does not necessarily result in
a high magnitude of loss. I have already shown that Zamir cannot commit to this being the
distinction, as he is open to an ideal-theoretic meat industry in which animals kept for meat
are not killed. However, let us imagine that things were otherwise, and thus concede that eggs
and milk do not  necessarily involve the infliction of a high magnitude of loss  even while
meat does. If one is designing ideal institutions, this conceptual fact is important. But if one
is talking about our actions here and now – and let us recall that this is a condition that Zamir
has introduced to talk  about  our “non-ideal”  actions  – it  is  surely the  practical fact  that
matters.  Compare:  Shooting  is  a  hobby that  need not  entail  a  loss  for  anyone.  A highly
responsible shooter could engage in her hobby only at carefully managed clay-pigeon shoots.
There is nothing essentially harmful about shooting. But that fact seems to have absolutely
no bearing on the condemnation we would rightly direct at someone who shoots people for
sport – and the condemnation that Zamir  does direct at those who shoot  animals for sport
(2007, 11). Equally, that the harm in some harmful animal agriculture is not essential to the
form of animal agriculture cannot justify or excuse those who support the harmful animal
agriculture in question.
Tentative vegans are thus going to have a lot of concerns with Zamir’s arguments for
vegetarianism here and now, even if they are sympathetic to his claim that a vegetarian utopia
is preferable to a vegan one. Zamir has a dilemma: given that he has failed to distinguish
between the ethics of eating meat (on the one hand) and the ethics of eating eggs and milk (on
the other), his argument leads him either to tentative veganism or conscientious omnivorism
(i.e., omnivorism favouring putatively humane farms). Either way, his arguments do not lead
to vegetarianism here and now.
It is worth closing our engagement with Zamir by questioning the “vegetarian” status
of his utopia (2007, 54-6; 104-6) – respectable though his vision may be, it just is not clear
that it is really a “vegetarian” utopia at all. Now, it is, as he carefully argues, not a  vegan
utopia. But that does not make it a  vegetarian utopia. We have already seen how Zamir is
open to eating the bodies of animals who have died naturally, and, indeed, of farming animals
so that we might eat their bodies when they die naturally. Meanwhile – something Zamir
does not address – technological advances have opened the door to the possibility of growing
meat  without  killing any animals  (see Donaldson and Carter  2016;  Milburn 2016).  Cells
taken from animals can be grown in a laboratory environment into safe and edible meat, with
commercialisation not far away. There is no obvious reason that such meat would not be
consistent  with  Zamir’s  position.  Presumably,  then,  there  are  a  wide  range of  ways that
Zamir’s “vegetarian” utopia is, ultimately, omnivorous. Not only, then, are there important
worries about Zamir’s vegetarianism in practice, but it is unclear whether he even advocates
vegetarianism in theory. The vegetarian seeking a grounding for her position would be well
advised to look elsewhere. 
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6: Alternative cases for vegetarianism: Consuming flesh, consuming bodies
Perhaps a vegetarian seeking principled arguments should move away from appeals to the
wrong  of  producing meat.  She  could  look  instead  to  the  wrong  of  consuming meat  or
animals’ bodies. I say meat or animals’ bodies as these are two different arguments, and, in
practice, they will pull in different directions – for example, those who take that it is wrong to
eat meat may be troubled by in vitro meat or even highly realistic plant-based “meats”, while
those who object to eating animals’ bodies may not be.
Arguments pushing in this direction are present but underdeveloped in animal ethics.
As such, this section is best understood not as an argument in favour of vegetarianism, but as
an indication of how such an argument could be built. 
Concerns about the eating of animal flesh – rather than with the suffering and death
necessary  to  acquire  it  –  appear  in  work  criticising  in  vitro meat  and  plant-based  meat
analogues. So, for example, John Miller (2012) and Matthew Cole and Karen Morgan (2013)
critique  in  vitro meat  for  reinforcing  a problematic  vision  of  the  place  that  meat  has  in
Western cultures – though their arguments may not be unique to Western cultures – thus
pointing  towards  an  objection  to  eating  meat  regardless of  the  presence  or  absence  of
suffering and death. Such critiques are not unique to critical theory. Bob Fischer and Burkay
Ozturk (2017) argue by analogy to imitation-human-skin lampshades that there is something
morally dubious about consuming meat analogues. By extension, perhaps they could argue
that there is something wrong with consuming “real” meat independently of any contribution
to  death  and  suffering  of  animals.  And  Susan  Turner  (2005)  argues  against  the
production/consumption of meat (“fake” or otherwise) regardless of the suffering and death
involved, arguing that animals may have a right “not to be represented as a mere resource”
(2005, 4–5).
Crucially, for current purposes, these kinds of arguments are about meat specifically –
they need not generalise to other animal products. They thus provide the seed of an argument
for vegetarianism, but not veganism. For example, it is clear that Turner’s argument does not
extend straightforwardly to the use of eggs and milk, while it is an open question whether
Fischer and Ozturk’s does.  Others exploring these questions have explicitly  affirmed that
their arguments against meat do not extend to milk and eggs. For example, Rebekah Sinclair
(2016)  –  drawing  upon  Adams’s  vegetarian/vegan  critical  theory  –  challenges  “meatless
meats”, rejecting the idea that meat is food, but does not extend her to challenge to products
seeking to mimic milk and eggs. This is because milk and eggs “do not imply a necessary
animal  death”  (2016,  231-2).  This  claim  is  vulnerable  to  similar  counters  to  Zamir’s
arguments, but the central insight – about the difference between meat on the one hand and
other animal products on the other – is plausible. It makes sense to reject the idea that meat is
food in a way that it does not to challenge the idea that, for example, milk is food:
Milk exists solely as food; in this sense, it is different from flesh/meat, which exists
first as the body of an animal. To deny that milk is food seems to suggest that infants,
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human and nonhuman, who drink their mothers’ milk are consuming something that
is not food. This seems to be straightforwardly incorrect. (Milburn 2018a, 272)
This passage is a response to a “metaphysical” challenge to the idea of milk as food. The
same paper – though a contribution to the literature on animal rights – defends the status of
milk as food against four other arguments:  ethical,  disgust-based, health-based, and racial
(see Milburn 2018a, 271-4). Where eggs fit in this kind of split is an interesting question –
and one that anyone seeking to defend vegetarianism using this approach should address.
Let us turn to respectful treatment of animals’ corpses. Chloë Taylor argues that “the
dominant Western worldview is deontological with respect to dead humans and utilitarian
with respect to dead animals of other species” (2013, 95). What this means is that (we assume
that) we respect an animal when we use (especially eat) as much of their corpse as possible,
while using (especially eating) a human’s corpse is (seen as) the height of disrespect. Perhaps
we can  understand  vegetarians  as  seeking  to  challenge  this  –  and  they  can  challenge  it
independently of concerns about the death and suffering of animals used in agriculture, thus
providing a seed of an argument for vegetarianism, but not veganism. Sue Donaldson and
Will  Kymlicka  are  two  theorists  who  challenge  the  disrespectful  treatment  of  animals’
bodies, and who thus oppose the eating of (some) animals independently of any belief in the
wrongness of killing animals or making them suffer. (To be clear, Donaldson and Kymlicka
certainly do condemn the killing and hurting of animals.) They write that ideas of respectful
corpse treatment 
are culturally (and religiously) variable, marking the boundaries of community. This
could mean that while there are some ways in which we should never treat a corpse –
human  or  animal,  citizen  or  foreigner  –  there  are  special  obligations  we  owe to
members  of  the  community.  …  Perhaps,  then,  we  ought  to  treat  the  bodies  of
domesticated  animals  the  same  way  as  human  bodies  in  any  given  society  or
community, but the same obligation does not apply for corpses of those from outside
the community. (2011, 151)
This means that the bodies of domestic animals cannot be used to produce meat, but does not
commit  the  authors  to  any  claim  about  milk  or  eggs.  This  argument  –  as  indicated  by
Donaldson  and  Kymlicka’s  talk  of  “members  of  the  community”  –  is  tied  up  in  their
particular “zoopolitical” theory. But similar arguments need not be.
Cora Diamond (1978) characterises part of what it means to see someone as a person,
or,  indeed,  an animal  as  a  “pet”,  as  seeing  them as “not  something to  eat”  (1978,  469).
Someone drawing upon this kind of approach could argue that appropriately seeing a being as
an animal – as a “living creature, or fellow creature” (1978, 474) – and appropriately relating
to that animal, would involve refusing to recognise their body as a resource and as food. This
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is  the  direction  in  which  Diamond  moves  when  criticising  Singer  for  apparently  being
“perfectly happy to eat the unfortunate lamb that has just been hit by a car” (1978, 472).
Diamond admits that it “does normally, or very often, go with the idea of a fellow creature,
that we do eat them” (1978, 475), but this is exactly what the vegetarian seeks to challenge.
For Diamond, this idea of a “fellow creature” offers a real possibility for an argument for
vegetarianism, though she does not fully develop it:
I introduced the notion of a fellow creature in answer to the question: How might I go
about showing someone that he had reason not to eat animals? I do not think I have
answered that so much as shown the direction in which I should look for an answer.
(1978, 477)
Crucially, for our purposes, rejecting the idea that the “fellow creature” is an edible thing
offers us the beginning of an argument for vegetarianism that does not quickly become an
argument for veganism. That the fellow creature is not an edible thing does not preclude the
fellow creature being a source of edible things.
Where do these half-arguments – arguments about the wrongs of eating flesh or eating
corpses – leave us? Let us imagine that one or both can be expanded into a full argument for
the wrongness of eating meat that says nothing about any wrong in eating eggs or dairy. On
the one hand, such an argument could be wholly free-standing, in which case the vegetarian
has a perfectly coherent argument for vegetarianism against both the omnivore and the vegan.
But it would be a curious vegetarian indeed who was motivated not because of the suffering
and death of animals but because of a relatively abstract concern with the wrong of eating
animals’ flesh or desecrating their corpses. More likely, this argument could be  combined
with an argument about the wrong of inflicting death and suffering on animals. It is a wrong/
bad involved in killing or hurting animals to acquire food, and, in addition, there is a wrong
in consuming meat/corpses, but not in eating eggs and milk.
Where does this position leave us? Let us draw upon the terms introduced by Zamir.
This  argument  gives  us  a  compelling  vision  of  a  vegetarian,  rather  than  vegan,  utopia.
Depending  precisely  what  is  meant  by  “meat”  or  “corpses”,  our  vegetarian  utopia  will
certainly  not  permit  Zamir’s  corpse-farming,  may  or  may  not  permit  in  vitro meat,  and
perhaps will not even permit plant-based “meats”. But it will allow eggs and milk. As such,
the vegetarian here and now would be justified in rejecting “principled veganism”, leaving
them with  the  options  of  tentative  veganism,  vegetarianism,  and  omnivorism.  This  new
argument (remember that we are yet to develop this argument – we are assuming that it can
be developed) gives the vegetarian a clear reason to reject omnivorism, even in more humane
forms, as they hold that there is a wrong in eating meat.
They are thus left with vegetarianism and tentative veganism. Given that they object
to death and suffering, they are presumably not going to want to support the egg and milk
industry – though perhaps, to again echo Zamir,  they may hold that supporting relatively
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humane egg and milk farming will help the industries transition towards more just forms. But
they certainly are not going to object to, say, eggs from backyard chickens (see Fischer and
Milburn 2017) or milk produced in particularly humane ways, whether this is from no-harm
farming or technological means (see Milburn 2018a). So, the “tentative vegans” imagined
might actually be – to coin a phrase – “particularly selective vegetarians” in many real-world
cases. They will not, though, be “particularly selective omnivores”. No matter how free from
suffering and death meat production is,  these vegetarians will reject it: roadkill (Bruckner
2015), Zamir’s corpse-farming, in vitro meat – all are out.
To summarise:  If  these arguments about the wrong of eating meat/corpses can be
made to work, they offer us a free-standing argument for vegetarianism, but not veganism. It
would be an odd argument, though, as it is makes no reference to the death and suffering of
animals. But if it is combined with more standard arguments, it can still give us an argument
for vegetarianism, and not veganism. Granted, this argument would permit vegetarians only
to support the most humane forms of acquiring eggs and milk (or, at a minimum, relatively
humane forms of acquiring eggs and milk) – but it would provide something that, to date, has
been  lacking  in  the  literature  in  animal  ethics  and  food  ethics:  a  consistent,  principled
argument for vegetarianism.
7: Concluding remarks
It  is  very  hard  to  argue  for  vegetarianism.  Most  arguments  for  vegetarianism,  on  closer
inspection, are revealed to be arguments for veganism. This chapter has reviewed the one
developed argument for vegetarianism in the philosophical literature, and found it wanting.
However, it has offered two other routes that one could take to argue for vegetarianism. One
is  thoroughly  pragmatic,  and highly  contingent.  This  would  see  vegetarians  defend  their
position  on  the  ground  that  vegetarianism is  a  good  “halfway  house”  to  veganism,  and
veganism is too demanding. The other, however, is more principled.  It argues that eating
meat or utilising the corpses of animals is wrong, independently of any wrong involved in
supporting harm to animals. This can provide a principled (if bizarre) free-standing argument
for vegetarianism, but, if combined with more standard arguments about the wrong involved
in harming (or supporting harm to) animals, could offer vegetarians a principled basis for
supporting some limited forms of egg and milk production, while wholeheartedly rejecting
farming animals for meat.
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